In a crucial meeting held in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 2024, the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, and the U.S. President, Joe Biden, engaged in discussions regarding the possibility of allowing Ukraine to deploy long-range missiles against Russia. The topic gained significant attention due to President Volodymyr Zelensky's recent visit to the United States and its potential implications on NATO and global security.

Despite the high stakes involved, no formal announcement was made following the meeting regarding the authorization of long-range missiles for Ukraine. It appears that both leaders decided to contemplate the issue further, likely due to concerns raised by Russian political leaders. One day prior to the meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a warning, claiming that NATO countries, including the United States and European nations, would essentially be at war with Russia if such missiles were permitted.

The legitimacy of Russia's concerns cannot be disregarded outright. While the West disputes Russia's sovereignty over certain regions, such as Crimea, Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhiya, and Kherson, it is widely accepted that the rest of Russia's territory remains under its sovereignty. This distinction implies that Russia can view attacks on its sovereign land differently from those on disputed territories. Consequently, any use of long-range missiles by NATO in Russian airspace, guided by U.S. military satellites, could be seen by Russia as an act of war.

To emphasize the significance of this issue, it is important to understand that the guidance signals for U.S. Advanced Tactical Missiles (ATACMS) and British Storm Shadow missiles do not rely on universally accessible civilian GPS signals. Instead, these weapons employ the highly secure M-code GPS capability, specifically designed for military use, to resist interference and jamming. By utilizing M-code signals transmitted by GPS III satellites, these long-range missiles exhibit enhanced accuracy and resilience, while allowing for restricted access to authorized users only.

The deployment of M-code GPS technology began with the launch of the first M-code-capable satellite in 2005. Since then, multiple GPS III satellites equipped with M-code capabilities have been launched, with ongoing efforts by the U.S. Space Force to increase their numbers. The integration of M-code capability is envisioned across various military platforms, from individual soldier systems to guided munitions.

However, it is worth noting that M-code signals can be regionally restricted, making it possible for the U.S. to deny M-code signal access to weapons supplied to Ukraine if it deems the airspace to be sovereign Russian territory. While M-code provides heightened security, reliability, and operational effectiveness in hostile environments, it is not entirely impervious to jamming or spoofing.

The outcome of the UK-US meeting suggests that further deliberation is necessary before a definitive decision can be made regarding the use of long-range missiles by Ukraine. The implications extend beyond the immediate conflict and touch on broader international security dynamics, particularly within the framework of NATO. As tensions continue to escalate, political leaders must carefully consider the ramifications of any actions that could further heighten the Ukraine-Russia crisis.