In a recent briefing conducted on the condition of anonymity, Turkish intelligence officials disclosed the recruitment tactics employed by Israeli intelligence within Turkey. The revelation came following a joint operation between Turkish intelligence and the police, resulting in the arrest of 34 individuals suspected of spying for Israeli secret services. It is believed that an additional 12 individuals connected to the network may have already left the country.

This marks the fourth counter-intelligence operation against informants and operatives associated with Israeli intelligence agencies, such as the Shin Bet and Mossad, in Turkey since 2021.

According to Turkish intelligence officials, Israeli officers typically operate through two distinct groups of people. The first group focuses on basic surveillance tasks and is recruited via intermediaries and online platforms. Job announcements with limited details or links are posted on social media and chat groups, enabling suitable individuals to contact Israeli officers. These tasks may initially appear unrelated but are designed to prepare the operatives for more significant missions.

Communication between Israeli officers and recruits is exclusively done in writing through messaging apps like Telegram and WhatsApp, with no in-person contact. Recruits are paid through intermediaries or messengers recruited via social media employment posts. They are informed that their payments are linked to illegal betting and gambling. To further conceal the origins of the funds, Israeli officers commonly employ cryptocurrency and hawala, an informal money transfer method.

As a working relationship based on confidence and trust develops, recruits might progress to a more tactical level, where they are asked to carry out sophisticated operations. In some cases, Israeli officers establish direct relationships with recruits, meeting them in person and providing substantial amounts of money. Recruits may also be subjected to polygraph tests.

Initially, operatives are assigned piecemeal tasks to create an action plan towards the ultimate targets. For instance, Israeli intelligence successfully recruited private detectives in Turkey to gather personal information, conduct research, and engage in surveillance activities such as filming, taking photos, and placing GPS devices on vehicles.

Among these groups, certain recruits are selected for more tactical roles. They are entrusted with setting up specialized WhatsApp groups for managing operations, establishing websites to disseminate disinformation and fake news, and facilitating money transfers. Israeli officers carefully choose these "tactical recruits" based on past operations to minimize the risk of detection by Turkish intelligence.

To ensure the recruits do not feel like they are betraying their country, they are offered psychological support, comfort, and significant financial incentives. Examples include a Palestinian student recruited by Israeli intelligence who reportedly received a Swiss visa from the consulate-general in Istanbul within an hour, without any formal application.

The testimonies of private detective Selcuk Kucukkaya, who admitted to working for Israeli secret services, further confirmed the methods employed by Israeli intelligence. Kucukkaya revealed that he began working for an insurance company, ultimately coming into contact with an individual named Jorge through Skype. Kucukkaya met Jorge and his manager, Alfonso, in various European cities, receiving instructions for missions and being paid in cash.

In one instance, Kucukkaya was instructed to track a Palestinian citizen from the moment he arrived at Istanbul airport to his final destination in the city. The objective was to gather information about the individual, such as whether he had a team or armed security with him, to identify weak points in his route for potential future attacks.

Turkish intelligence officials also claimed that recruits like Kucukkaya were provided with specially designed bags containing secret compartments to evade X-ray detectors and K-9 searches.

These revelations shed light on the intricate methods employed by Israeli intelligence to cultivate spies in Turkey, primarily targeting Palestinian and Middle Eastern nationals. The ongoing operations by Turkish intelligence and law enforcement highlight their commitment to countering such activities within the country.