In a significant decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it easier for workers to bring employment discrimination suits over job transfers based on sex, race, religion, or national origin. This ruling aims to resolve conflicting decisions in lower courts regarding what constitutes illegal discrimination when it comes to job transfers.

The case that brought this issue to the forefront involved Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, a police sergeant who claimed she was transferred from her position as a plainclothes police officer in the intelligence section of the St. Louis Police Department solely because she is a woman. Muldrow had a distinguished career in the Intelligence Division, working in the division from 2008 to 2017 handling public corruption and human trafficking cases. She also held various leadership roles such as overseeing the Gang Unit and serving as head of the Gun Crimes Unit.

However, Muldrow's transfer was orchestrated by a new unit commander who justified the move by citing the dangerous nature of the work in the Intelligence Division. Despite objections from Muldrow, she was reassigned to a uniformed job in the Fifth District, where her responsibilities included supervising neighborhood patrol officers and handling administrative tasks.

Although Muldrow's pay and rank stayed the same, she believed she had been harmed by the transfer. She lost her FBI status and the accompanying vehicle that came with it. Additionally, she had to work nights and weekends, departing from the Monday-through-Friday workweek she was accustomed to in the intelligence unit.

Initially, both a federal district court judge and the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Muldrow, stating that she failed to demonstrate any "significant" harm to her title, salary, or benefits that would support her claim of discrimination. However, on Wednesday, the Supreme Court reversed that ruling and established a more conclusive test for lower courts to determine whether a discrimination claim based on altered conditions of employment can proceed to trial.

Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the majority, indicated that federal law banning employment discrimination encompasses not only economic discrimination but also discrimination in the "terms" and "conditions" of employment. This means that a transfer that significantly changes the "what, where, and when" of an employee's work can be considered discriminatory.

Contrary to the 8th Circuit's requirement for "significant" or "material" harm, the Supreme Court declared that if an employee can show some harm resulting from sex, race, religion, or national origin, it is sufficient to support a discrimination claim. The court emphasized that the statute targets practices that "treat a person worse" based on these protected characteristics.

While the decision was unanimous, three justices - Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Brett Kavanaugh - expressed their concurrence with the outcome but raised concerns about the reasoning behind it. Justice Alito went so far as to criticize the majority opinion as "unhelpful" and stated that he did not understand its meaning. Justice Thomas acknowledged that the 8th Circuit may not have applied a stringent enough standard, and Justice Kavanaugh favored a simpler approach, stating that any job transfer based on sex, race, religion, or national origin is inherently discriminatory, regardless of concrete harm caused.

The Supreme Court's ruling sets a new precedent in employment discrimination cases related to job transfers, providing clearer guidelines for lower courts. This decision ensures that employees who experience harm due to discriminatory transfers have an accessible path to seek justice.